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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

MARY BALLEN,

Appellant,
Case
No. 7354

-vs.GEORGE A. GASP ARAC, JR.,

Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMEN'T
This is an appeal from the judgment made and
entered by the Honorable J. Allan Crockett, of the Third
Judicial District, in and for Summit County, State of
Utah, on the 30th day of November, 1948, and made final
by the Order of said Court,. overruling the Motion for
New Trial in s-aid case on the 21st day of March, 1949.
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The Complaint alleges as follows :
"Plaintiff complains of defendant and for
cause of action alleges:
That theretofore and particularly for a
period of over two years, prior to this date, very
friendly, confidential and social relationship
existed between the plaintiff and the defendant,
in that plaintiff had been engaged to marry the
defendant, by which the close relationship hereinbefore grew out of.
1.

2. That plaintiff and defendant were desir-ous of operating a business in which they were
mutually and jointly interested in, and being one
of the nature of a joint undertaking.
3. That during the period aforesaid, p·laintiff had certain available money and avenues by
which other monies could be obtained for the
operation of a. business, while the defendant was
in reduced financial condition, such that plaintiff
and defendant conceived the plan to purchase a
piece of real property in s·ummit County, Utah,
hereinafter described, and to erect thereupon a
lodge, which would serve meals to traveling transients and would operate all the year around and
particularly during the winter when skiing was
1n vogue.
4. That this undertaking was on the basis
that plaintiff would supply what available money
she had and what monies would be necessary to
erect a lodge as aforesaid, and operate the same,
and that defendant was to use his labor in the
erection of said lodge, which would be charged as
against an interest in said business and that the
p·arties thereto would then determine the ·proportionate interest in said lodge undertaking.
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5. That pursuant to ~aid plan the plaintiff
did advance to the defendant the sum of $500.00
on September 20, 1946 and $2,500.00 on October
17, 1946, \Yhich said sum of $3,000.00 \vas used to
purchase the following described property located
in Sun1n1it County, State of Utah, and more particularly described as follo\vs, to-wit:
Beginning at the Northeast Corner of
the ~ orthwest quarter of the Southeast quarter of Section 10, Township 1 South, Range
3 East, Salt Lake Meridian~ thence West
4.62.9 feet; thence South 82° 00' West 250.9
feet; thence North go 00' 'Vest 35.5 feet;
thence West 603.5 feet; thence South 0° 02.'
East 1320 feet; thence East 1320 feet; thence
North oo 02' West 1320 feet to p·oint of beginning, containing 39.898 acres more or less.
Beginning at a point 1,671.2 feet South
and 1,577.1 feet West of the Northeast corner
of Section 10, Township 1 South, Range 3
East, Salt Lake Meridian, which is a steel
pipe set in concrete cap marked ''Highway
Right of Way;" thence South 48° 21' West
362.8 feet; thence South 70° 00' East 396.4
feet; thence South 10° 00' West 304.6 feet;
thence South oo 02' East 293.0 feet to the
East-West center line of Section 10, where
the Northeast corner of the Northwest quarter of the Northeast quarter of Section 10
bears East 21.9 feet; thence West 441.0 feet,
thence North 82° 00' East 193.5 feet; thence
North go 00' West 196.2 feet; thence South
82° 00' West 418.8 feet, whence the Northwest
corner 2 acre tract bears South 82° 00' West
25.6 feet; thence North oo 2' West 445.8 feet;
to intersection of Highway Right of Way,
thence North 61 o 58' East 236.4 feet to HighSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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way Right of W-ay marker, thence North 60°
12' East 501.0 feet to point of beginning, containing 9.572 acres more or less, together with
all water rights appurtenant and belonging to
said premises. Excepting, however, a Right
of Way one and one half Rods wide from
County Road to the North·vvest corner_ of said
Section 10 aforesaid.
6. That defendant did purchase the aforesaid property and did place the same in his individual name. That subsequently thereto, plaintiff advanced the sum of $600.00 on October 19,
1946, and $5,500.00 on December 7, 1946, which
monies were used for the erection of what is
known as Little Pine Lodge and that defendant
upon the erection of said building did operate
said Lodge and until on or about October, 1947,
when said Lodge was closed.
7. That in addition to the aforesaid sums,
plaintiff further advanced the sum of $4,343.00 to
the defendant, which was used by the defendant
in the operation of the said business.
7. That at the time of the defendant's acquiring the real property hereinbefore described
and on numerous occasions, subsequent thereto,
and as the inducement therefor, said defendant
expressly declared, promised and represented that
he would transfer to the plaintiff, by proper deed,
her equity in the property when it was determined
the amount of equity which the defendant had
earne_d by his labor in erecting the Lodge on said
premises.
8. That :plaintiff upon numerous occasions
since on or about the month of October 1946 has
' to
requested the defendant to execute and ' deliver
her a 1).roper deed to said land, but that defendant
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has refused so to do, such that although plaintiff
has paid for said land and the major portion of
the erection of said Lodge, and therefore has an
equitable title to the sanlP, yet the legal title is
·
still in said defendant.
9. That the defendant has never rendered an
accounting of his labor in the erection of said
Lodge, such that this plaintiff has no knowledge
as to 'Yhat proportionate interest is claimed by
said defendant in the total expenditures for the
purchase of the land and erection of the Lodge
and operation of said business, and that no accounting of said business has been demanded and
that defendant still fails and refuses to render
such an ac-counting or transfer such proportionate
interest as is equitable to the plaintiff in and to
the real prop·erty hereinbefore mentioned.
10. That plaintiff is informed and. believes
and on such information and belief alleges that
the said defendant has listed with the MultipJe
Listing Bureau of Salt Lake City, Utah, the aforesaid property for sale, and not to account for the
proceeds thereof to the plaintiff.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays judgment that
the defendant George A. Gasparac, Jr., be ordered to give a full and complete accounting of
his stewardship in this matter of all of the sums,
profits, rentals and amounts of every kind and
nature ever ·collected in this operation.
That defendant be required to pay to :plaintiff
herein, the amount found to be due to her by
reason of said accounting.
That up·on determination of the proportionate
interest of said plaintiff and defendant in said
undertaking, that the Court enter a Decree, vestSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ing the title of said tract of land in the plaintiff,
in the interest thereinbefore determined.
That an Order be made dissolving said joint
undertaking and for all costs of suit and such
other and further Order as n1ay to the Court seem
meet and proper in the premises.''
(Duly verified)
The Answer and Cross Complaint of the defendant
is as follows :
''Comes now the defendant and for answer to
plaintiff's complaint on file herein admits, denies,
and alleges as follows, to-wit:
1. Defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 and 2 of plaintiff's complaint.
2. Answering paragraph 3, defendant admits
the allegations contained therein excep~t that part
thereof which states that "the defendant was in
reduced financial condition".
3. Answering paragraph 4, defendant alleges
the undertaking was on the basis that necessary
money or monies would be provided by one Anna
Uriona also known as Anna Lujan, the mother of
plaintiff, and that plaintiff and defendant would
repay said Anna U riona from any profits which
might accure from the said undertaking. Defendant further denies that there was any agreement
that a determination of the proportionate inte-rest
in the lodge undertaking would be made.
4. Defendant admits the allegations contained
in paragraph 5 of plaintiff's complaint.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7

5. Ans"~ering' paragraph 6, defendant admits
that the said p·roperty was purchased and that the
same was placed in his individual name and that
a building known as Little Pine Lodge was erected
and that defendant, upon the erection of said
building did operate said lodge until on or about
October 1947 when said lodge was closed; but
haYing no knowledge concerning amounts of
money allegedly advanced by plaintiff, denies each
and every ·allegation referring to such advances.
6. Answering paragraph 7, defendant denies
each and every allegation therein contained.
7. Ans"Tering paragraph 8, defendant denies
each and every allegation therein contained.
8. Answering paragraph 9, defendant alleges
that all of the records in connection \vith the
erection and operation of said lodge have been
kept by ·plaintiff under agreement bet"reen plaintiff and defendant and that defendant has not
been granted access to said records by the plaintiff and is accordingly unable to render an accounting and further that he has no knowledge or
information concerning the financial status of the
undertaking.
9. Answering ~paragraph 10, defendant denies
that said property was listed with the Multiple
Listing Bureau of Salt Lake City, Utah, and
further denies that there has been any sale of
said property.
10. Defendant denies each and every allegation of said complaint not herein · specifically
admitted, modified or denied.
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CRoss CoMPLAINT
Comes now the defendant and for cause of
action against plaintiff complains and alleges as
follows, to wit:
1. That heretofore, and particularly for a
period of over two years, prior to this date, a very
friendly, confidential and social relationship
existed between the plaintiff and the defendant,
in that plaintiff had been engaged to marry the
defendant, by which the close relationship hereinbefore grew out of.
2. That plaintiff and defendant were desirous
of operating a business in which they would be
mutually and jointly interested.
3. That during the period aforesaid, plaintiff
had certain available money and avenues by which
other monies could be obtained for the operation
of a business, . such that plaintiff and defendant
conceived a plan to purchase a piece of real property in Summit County, Utah, hereinafter described, and to erect thereupon a lodge, which would
serve meals to traveling transients and would
operate all year around and particularly during
the winter when skiing was in vogue.
4. 'That it was agreed between the parties that
plaintiff would p~rovide certain money and that
her mother, Anna Uriona, also known as Anna
Lujan, would also provide necessary money for
the erection of a lodge as aforesaid. That the
defendant was to contribute his services and labor
in the erection of said lodge and that on the completion thereof plaintiff would leave her employment in Salt Lake City and would devote her full
time to the operation of said lodge.
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5. That pursuant to said plan, plaintiff and
her mother, the said . .-\.nna Uriona, advanced certain sun1s of money, "\Yhich Inoney \Vas used to
purchase property, located in Summit County,
State of Utah, and ,,~hich is n1ore particularly
described in paragraph 5 of plaintiff's complaint
on file herein; that said property was purchased
in the individual naine of the defendant.
6. That after the purchase of the property
as aforesaid, defendant gave up his employment
and during the :period from September 1946 to
February 1947, devoted his full time and efforts
to and completed the erection of lodge on the said
property which said lodge is kno,vn as Little Pine
Lodge; that said lodge was erected as a result
of the work and efforts of the defendant; that
defendant devised the plans of said lodge,
arranged for the installation of the equipment
therein, the laying of necessary "\Vater mains and
landscaped the surrounding premises; that as a
result of his connection with various mining companies in Summit County, Utah, defendant was
able to obtain critical building materials and other
critical items which were difficult to obtain on the
market and without vvhich the lodge could not be
properly completed; that the contribution of
defendant to the erection of said lodge has a reasonable value of $8,000.00.
7. That after the erection of said lodge \Vas
completed and opened for business in February
1947, plaintiff and defendant worked at the lodge
and operated the same during the ·period from
Fehruary to May 1947; that during said period,
the lodge operated at a profit and gave indication
of becoming a p~rosperous undertaking; that in
May 1947, plaintiff, contrary to her agreement as
aforesaid, discontinued her work at the lodge and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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from that thne until' the present time has not
assisted in any way in the operation of said lodge
except for a period of a few days in August 1947;
that from May to November 1947, defendant was
required to and did operate the lodge alone without help from plaintiff and that during this period
no profits whatsoever were made from the venture.
8. That during the period from October to
December 1947, defendant finished two upstairs
rooms in said lodge, which rooms have substantially increased the value of the lodge.
9. That before and since the erection of the
said lodge, defendant has made substanti~l monetary advances to the venture; that sai_d advances
have been used for the purchase of materials and
for the payment of various expenses in connection
with op·eration of the said business; that said
advances amount to $1995.77.
10. That since February 1947, all records and
accounts in connection with the venture have been
kept and maintained by the plaintiff and that she
still is the custodian of all books, records and
monies of the said business; that defendant has
no knowledge of the accounts incident to said
business.
11. That plaintiff has at various times made
monetary advances to the undertaking but that
the amounts thereof and other details in connection therewith are unknown to the defendant.
12. That defendant has been at all times
ready, willing, and able and is now ready, willing,
and able to execute a deed to the plaintiff covering
said property on receipt from plaintiff of the
amount representing the value of his contribution
to said business.
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''THEREFORE, defendant ·pTays judgment as
follows:
1. That the complaint of plaintiff on file herein be by the Court dismissed and that upon said
con1plaint Judgment of the No Cause of Action
be n1ade and entered by the Court in favor of the
defendant and against the plaintiff.
2. ·That the plaintiff be ordered to give a full
and complete accounting of her stewardship in
connection with all sums, profits and amounts of
every kind and nature whatsoever arising out of
said undertaking.
3. That plaintiff be ordered to pay to defendant the amount found to he due him by reason of
said accounting.
4. That a division order be made in connection with the proportionate share of each owner
on said property.
5. That an order be made dissolving said joint
undertaking and for all costs of suit and such
other and further order as may to the court seem
1neet and rp:roper in the premises.''
(Duly verified)
The Reply of plaintiff is as follows:
''Comes now the plaintiff and for reply to defendant's Answer, admits, denies and alleges as
follows:
1. Replying to paragraph 3 of defendant's
Answer, plaintiff denies the same.
2. Replying to paragraph 8 of defendant's
Answer, plaintiff denies the same.
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For reply to defendant's Cross Complaint:
1. Replying to paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of defendant's Cross Complaint, plaintiff admits tne
same.
2. Replying to paragraph 4 of defendant's
Cross Complaint ,plaintiff denies ''that it was
agreed between the parties that plaintiff would
provide certain money and that her mother, Anna
Uriona also known as Anna Lujan, would also
provide necessary money for the erection of a
lodge as aforesaid". Admits'' that defendant was
to contribute his services and labor in the erection of said lodge", but denies "that on the completion thereof plaintiff would leave her employment in Salt Lake City and would devote her full
time to the operation of said lodge''.
3. Replying to paragraph 5 of defendant's
Cross Complaint plaintiff admits ''that :pursuant
to said plan, plain tiff advanced certain sums of
money, which money was used to purchase property located in Summit County, State of Utah,
and which is more particularly described in paragraph 5 of plaintiff's complaint on file herein; and
that said property was purchased in the individual name of defendant'', but denies that her
mother, the said Anna Uriona, advanced certain
sums of money, which money was used to purchase property located in Summit County, State
of Utah, and which is more particularly described
in :paragraph 5 of plaintiff's complaint on file
herein.
4. Replying to paragraph 6 of defendant's
Cross Complaint, plaintiff denies the same.
5. Replying to paragraph 7 of defendant's
Cross Complaint plaintiff admits ''that after the
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erection of said lodge \Yas cornpleted and opened
for business in February 1947, plaintiff and defendant \vorked at the lodge and operated the
san1e during the period from February to May
1947' ', but denies ••that during said period, the
lodge operated at a profit and gave indication of
becoming a prosperous undertaking'' ; denies
"'that in May 1947, plaintiff, contrary to her
agreement as aforesaid, discontinued her work at
the lodge and from that tirne until the present
tirue has not assisted in any \Yay in the operation
of S'aid lodge, except for a period of a few days in
. .~ugust 1947"; denies "that from May to N ovember 1947, defendant was required to and did operate the lodge alone without help from plaintiff,
that during this period no profits vYhatsoever were
made from the venture''.
6. Replying to paragraph 8 of defendant's
Cross Complaint this plaintiff has no information
or knowledge as to the facts alleged in said paragraph and therefore denies the same.
7. Replying to paragraph 9 of defendant's
Cross Complaint :plaintiff denies the same.
8. Replying to paragraph 10 of defendant's
Cross Complaint plaintiff denies "that since February 1947, all records and accounts in connection with the venture have been kept and maintained by the plaintiff and that she still is the
custodian of all books, records and monies of the
said business". D·enies ''that defendant has no
knowledge of the ·accounts incident to said business''; admits that plaintiff has certain ledger
accounts and check books which are incident and
part of said business.
9. Replying to paragraph 11 of defendant's
Cross Complaint, plaintiff admits that she has at
various times made monetary advances to the
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undertaking but denies that the amount thereof
and other d~tails in connection therewith are unknown to the defendant.
10. Re:plying to paragraph 12 of the defendant's Cross Complaint, plaintiff denies the same.
WHER.EFORE, plaintiff having fully replied
to defendant's Answer and Cross Complaint,
plaintiff prays judgment as follows:
1. That judgment be entered in accordance
with the prayer of plaintiff's complaint and that
defendant's Cross Complaint be dismissed.''

(Duly Verified)
U[)on these pleadings, the trial 'v.as had before the
Court without a jury and the Judgment appealed from
was entered in behalf of plaintiff and defendant, and to
reverse and set aside this said Judgment, this appeal is
taken.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR UPON WHICH
PLAINTIFF RELIES FOR REVERSAL
Plaintiff eontends that the trial Court erred in the
following particulars :
1. In admitting evidence offered by defendant and
objected to by plaintiff in an attempt to prove the value
of labor of defendant and ·monies expended by defendant
in proof of defendant's counterclaim, when no bill of
particulars was submitted until examination of defendant
at trial, when bill of particulars had been duly de1nanded.
1

2.

Not finding on material issues of accounting of

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15
monies adYaneed by the pl;aintif£ to the account of defendant.
3. In finding as it did in Paragraph 6 of the Findings of Fart as follo,Ys:
''That during and since the erection of the
lodge, defendant has made monetary advances to
the venture totaling $1,388.49' ',
and entering its conclusions of law based on said finding
that defendant was entitled to 23% of the :p,roceeds resulting from the sale of the property for the following
reasons:
(a) That defendant made no accounting of monies
advanced nor did he show that there 'vas not sufficient
monies advanced by plaintiff or income from sales to
pay the bills claimed by defendant.
(b) That monies claimed paid by defendant were
not proven by competent evidence.
4. In finding as it did in Paragraph 8 of the Findings of Fact as follows :
"That the services performed by the defendant from September, 1946 to February, 1947, in
erecting the lodge have a reasonable value of
$2,160.00, said amount being based on an average
of ten hours work per day for six days per week
for 24 weeks at the rate of $1.50 per hour; that
the services 1J•erformed by the defendant in managing, operating and maintaining the lodge during the period from February, 1947, until June,
1947, have a reasonable value of $1,440.00, said
amount being based on an average of ten hours
per day for six days per week for 16 weeks at
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the rate of $1.50 ·per hour; that the services performed by the defendant in managing, operating
and maintaining the lodge for the period from
June to November, 1947, have a reasonable value
of $714.00, said amount being based on an average of seven hours p·er day for six days per week
for 17 weeks at the rate of $1.00 per hour,"
and entering its Conclusion of Law based on said Finding that defendant after payment of debts from the proceeds of the sale of the ~property was entitled to 23%
thereof, f.or the following reason:
(a) ·That th~ only evidence of the value of the
service of defendant is the rute of $1.00 per hour and
the total number of hours worked is speculative.
ARGUMEN'T

I.
IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE OFFERED BY DEFENDANT AND OBJECTED TO BY PLAINTIFF IN AN ATTEMPT TO PROVE THE VALUE
OF LABOR OF DEFENDANT AND MONIES EXPENDED BY DEFENDANT IN PROOF OF DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIM, /WHEN NO
BILL OF PARTICULARS WAS SUBMITTED UNTIL EXAMINATION
OF DEFENDANT AT TRIAL, WHEN BILL OF PARTICULARS HAD
BEEN DULY DEMANDED.

The statute here involved is 104-13-3:

''104-13-3. AN ACCOUNT, HOW PLEADED- BILL OF PARTIC·ULARS.
''It is not necess'ary for a p·arty to set forth
in a pleading the items of an account therein alSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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leged, but he must deliYer to the adverse party,
within ten days after a den1and therefor in writing~ a copy of the account, or be precluded from
giving evidence thereof. The court, or a judge
thereof~ may order a further account \\'"hen the
one delivered is too general or is defective in any
particular.' '
The record is further born out in that a demand for
bill of particulars 'Yas served on the 29th day of July,
1948, and filed July 30, 1948 ( R. 13).
The case proceeded to trial on the 15th day of November, 1948, ap·pellant adducing her evidence, and respondent taking the stand and being asked general questions until the question of proof of the value of respondent's labor came up. (R. 78)
Direct examination of George Gaspara.c, Jr., by
Mr. Neslen:

''Q. And how was that accomplished, did you,
in fact, build the Lodge~
MR. BEATIE: Just a moment, I am going to
object to that question on the ground that this
particular witness is not competent, and I object,
further, that the question in effect is an attempt
to get a general statement with reference to the
work entailed on the part of this prarticular defendant, which we ob·ject to, on the grounds that
there has been a demand for a bill of p-articulars
in this particular case which has been outstanding
for over five months, and, up until the present
moment, none has ever been supplied, nor delivered. We therefore object to any testimony with
reference to any of the construction work by this
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particular defendant, and I cite your Honor, I
have a California case, a recent California case,
with reference to this particular thing under our
same statute, if you desire to hear it.
(Discussion.)
MR. NESLEN: May I state I have a bill of
particulars here that I intended to file, but which,
in view of the misunderstanding today, I wasn't
able to do, and it has been signed by ~ir. Gasparae.
(Discussion.)
THE COURT : This is off the record, Miss
Reporter.
(Discussion.)
THE COURT : And I believe I am going to
let you file it. I think it improper-! don't think
this matter has had quite the attention it should
have had, both with respect to its coming to trial
today and also. the filing of that, but I am reluctant to adhere to the penalty p~rescribed by statute because we just can't find out the facts apparently and do justice between these parties
without looking into the matter of Mr. Gasparac's
claims.
If this bill of particulars, by any reason, or
for any reason, takes Mr. Beatie by surprise, or
puts them to any disadvantage because of its late
filing, I will simply continue the matter for sufficient time for him to meet any difficulties that
might arise because of its failure and because of
the failure to file it before this time, and you may
file it at this time, and go ahead and receive evidence concerning the matter.
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The last question \Ya8 put to him wouldn't
haYe been helpful, any,Yay, if he had ansvvered.
Did you build it J? Let's find out vvhat he did.
:JlR. XESLEX: That is \Yhat I \Yant to ask
him.
Q. ~lr. Gasparac, in building this Lodge, just
explain to the court "~hat you did .

..._\. \\Tell, I did just about everything-! mean,
I took care ofTHE COURT : Let me see a copy of the bill
of particulars, will you pleas-e'
:\IR. NESLEN: Do you want him to
your Honor~

p~roceed,

THE COURT: Yes.
MR. BEATIE: May I make one observation
bill of particulars which is now served on me in
\Yith respect to this-may I make exception to the
that the S"ame does not disclose any material,
such as, for instance, as an i tern after the total
$22.021, "September '46 to July '47, full time
work in building Lodge at the rate of $600 a
month, eleven months, $6,600''; now, that doesn't
disclose anything; he may have charg~d $600 one
month and five hundred the next, and doesn't tell
me whether that is a standard rate or whether
there was any agreement or hoV\T many hours
work or anything of the nature. I say, bill itself
is very uncertain, gives me nothing exceptreading-! don't know whether purchased Park
City, Heber, or whether purchased Salt Lake City.
THE COURT: Don't know what kind of
lumber, or anything of the kind; very general, I
will s·ay that, but let's go ahead and examine the
witness.''
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Thus it is apparent that appellant in no respect
kne,~,r how much labor res'pondent had expended or what
monies were advanced by him in the building of the
Little Pine Lodge.
The following cases ·are on this first point that without the filing of a Bill of Particulars the party required
to file the sa1ne by statute cannot adduce evidence as to
said account.

Inland Engineering & Construction Co .., v. Maryland ·Casualty Comp1any, et al, 290 Pac. page 367, 76
Utah, page 435.
J. Elias Hansen, said at page 377:

''The penalty, and the only penalty, p-rescribed by statute for the failure of a party to furnish
a bill of particulars when demand is made, is that
the ·party so in default is ''precluded from giving
evidence thereof." Comp. Laws Utah 1917, No.
6598. If, therefore, a bill of particulars is demanded, but not furnished or filed, and if at the
trial the ~party demanding the bill of particulars
fails to object to the introduction of evidence
upon the ground that a bill of particulars has not
been furnished or filed, it would seem to follow
that the failure of the adverse party to furnish
or file a bill of particulars is thereby waived.''

Sanborn v. D-entler, 166 Pac., 62, 97 Wash. 149, 6
A.L.R. 749.

J. Holcomb said at page 63 :
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cretion "~ith the court, and that respondent \Yas
exrused from furnishing the bill of particulars of
these items under the allegation in connection
there"~ith that the exact ainount of Inedicine given
at each Yisit, or its value, could not be positively
ascertained, and that the fair Yalue of such medicine given each Yisit could not be stated. It is
true that in many cases the requireinent of a bill
of particulars is a. rna tter of discretion with the
court; but under our practice, under Section 284,
Rem. Code, when an account is sued upon, unless
the party, ·within 10 days after demand therefor
in "Triting by the adverse party, shall deliver to
the adverse p·arty a verified bill of particulars of
the items of the account, he is p·recluded from
giving evidence thereof, and in case an itemized
account stated is defective the court may order a
further account. It was shown at the trial that
the respondent kept an account hook with all his
accounts shown therein, and that the particular
items of account with Mr. and Mrs. Woodman .
were kept in that book in the ordinary course of
business, together with other accounts, and all
the items of the visits and memoranda as to the
nature of the ailments with which the patients
were suffering were kept therein.
''In Plummer v. Well, 15 \Vash. 427, 46 Pac.
648, we held that an allegation in connection with
the bill of particulars, to the effect that it was impossible for the party relying thereon to comply
with the order of the court any better than he had
already done, or to make the bill of particulars
any more specific on the :points directed in the
order of the court furnished no excuse; and it
was stated that the bill of particulars furnished
was insufficient, and ''Its insufficiency cannot be
excused upon the ground that plaintiff kept no
books and cannot specify the services or state
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their value. l-Ie assumed the burden of so doing
when he brought this action in the present form.
* .:~ * "The failure to keep an account of these
services is the fault of the plaintiff and he must
suffer for it, if any one' ''. Again, in Moore v.
Scharnikow, 48 Wash. 564, 94 Pac. 117, it was
said:
''In a mercantile account, or in any account
which is made up of several and distinct items, it
is proper for the court to require that the value
of each article be separatPly stated. So also a
physician since he bases the value of his services
on the number of visits made the patient, or the
number of prescri1>tions given him, may be required to set out in his bill of items the charge
made for each visit, or each prescription.''
"It certainly was as possible for respondent
to itemize the quantity and value of the medicine
furnished by him at each visit, when making his
entries in his book, and it was for him to itemize
the number and length of his visits, the nature
of the other s-ervices performed by him, and the
kind of medicines furnished. If he could not, he
is the one who should suffer. Under the statute
heretofore quoted we think his evidence as to the
amount and value of the medicines furnished
should have been excluded for his failure to furnish, upon demand, a bill of particulars thereof.''

Lonsdale v. Oltmwn, 52 N. W. 131, 50 Minn. 52.
C. J. Giffin said

~at

page 131:

''In this case which was an action to recover
for services as a surgeon and drugs and mediSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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cines rendered and furnished by plaintiff on
diYers dates, the defendant, pursuant to the Gen.
St. 1878, Ch. '66, Sec. 105, served "~ritten notice of
den1and for a copy of plaintiff's account, which
as disregarded. ..A. t the trial the defendant at
the proper time objected to eYidence of the account for the reason that the demand had not
been complied " . .ith and the objection "\Vas overruled. The statute is e~plicit, that upon failure
to furnish the copy when demanded, the party
shall 'be precluded from giving evidence thereof. ' . .\11 that the ·party demanding need do at
the trial is to make timely and proper objection
bringing to the knowledge of the court the fact
of such demand. ''
7

"

W. C. Early
C. J.

cf;

\~Vbitfield

Co., et al. v. Long, 42 So. 348.
said at page 348:

''The court below should not have permitted any evidence to be introduced by the defendant for the reason that no bill of particulars was
furnished by the defendant after demand made
upon him in strict compliance with the statute.
Sec. 1652 Code 1892. ''

Columbus d!; Greenville Ry. Co. v. Miss. Clinic, 120
So. 203.
J. Anderson said at page 205:

"Under the statute appellant was entitled to
a bill of particulars of ap'p•ellee 's demand in order
that appellant might intelligently make defense
thereto. Anything less than an itemized account
setting out each visit made by Dr. Yales and the
charge therefore "\vould not be a bill of particuSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

24

lars. When the statute is not cornplied 'vith in
that respect by its expre~s language no evidence
is admissible to establish the account. Flint &
Co. v. Brown, 133 Miss. 9; 96 So. 402. Wolff v.
Hopkins, 145 Miss. 827, 111 So. 290. It follows
that the court erred in admitting the testimony
of Dr. Yales in the absence of such an itemized
account.''

Fisher v. Brotherton, et al, 255 Pac. 854, 82 Cal.
App. 532.

J. Nourse said at pages 857-8 :
''The error committed in permitting respondent, in the course of her examinations before the
referee, to refer to the bill of particulars which
had been prepared by her counsel, is of a different character. VVhen the respondent gave her
notice of rescission of the contract, she included
a demand upon appellant that he pay the sum of
$6,860 to reimburse her for the moneys ·expended
by her in the care and maintenance of the ranch,
which sum she alleged to be in excess of ~all moneys
which she had received from the proceeds of the
operation of the ranch. Her complaint was filed
October 8, 1918, and on November 6, 1918, the appellant served upon her a demand for a bill of
particulars covering such items. This demand
was ignored, and the caus-e went to trial on December 20, 1918; the first trial resulting in 'a
judgment for the ap·pellant herein. Thereafter,
and on the 18th day of June, 1920, a new trial
having been granted, th-e cause again came on for
trial and the matter of adjustment of accounts of
operation of the respondent's properties was
order·ed heard before a referee.
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" . ..-\. t this hearing a bill of particulars dated
June 12, 1920, "~as offered by the res~pondent and
the objection of the appellant that it '\Yas inad- .
missible, because a copy had not been delivered
'vithin the time required by la\v, vvas overruled.
Exception to this ruling \Ya~ certified to the trial
court and the ruling \vas sustained. This was
error. Section 454, Code of Civil Procedure, provides that, \\""hen a party demands a bill of particulars covering the items of an account in suit,
a copy thereof must be delivered within five days
after the demand ; otherwise evidence thereof is
to be precluded. In St. John v. Consolidated Construction Co., 182 Cal. 25, 28, 189 P. 276, 277, the
Supreme Court held that it was within the power
of the trial court to relieve a party from his default in complying with the demand for a bill of
particulars, and we assume that what was meant
by this decision is that, wh·en timely ap!plication
is made under section 473, Code of Civil Procedure, for relief from the mistake, in~advertence,
or neglect of the party, the court may grant the
relief as if some order or proceeding had been
taken against the party in default. There is, however, no uncertainty in the meaning of Section
454 of the Code that, when the demand is, not
com·pJied with within the prescribed time, the
party is thereby precluded from giving evidence
on the subject-matter of the account. As the record stands here, no applieation for relief from
this default was requested or granted, and all
evidence touching the subject-matter included in
that demand was improperly admitted.''
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Vassere v. Joerger, 68 Pac. (2d) 363.

J. Fullen said at page 364 :
''The defendant. demanded a bill of particulars, the plaintiff failed to comply with this demand within five days as :provided by s·ection 454
of the Code of Civil Procedure, and defendant
noticed a motion to exclude evidence thereof at
the trial. This motion was granted conditionally,
the court granting plaintiff an additional ten days
in which to file a bill of particulars. No bill -vvas
ever filed, and upon that ground it -vvas proper
for the court to enter a judgment of dismissal of
the action.·''

Elm.ore v. Tingley, 248

P~ac.

706, 78 Cal. .A!pp. 460.

J. Hart said at page 710:
''The failure of the defendant to deliver to
the p~laintiff within the time required a copy of
the account upon which the counterclaim first set
up in the answer was based, justified the trial
court, in the exercise of its discretion, in refusing
to allow defendant to introduce evidence tending
to p·rove the account.''

Munger v. Nelson, 201 Pac. 286, 61 Mont. 104.
The Court said at page 288:
''Furthermore, it does not appear from the
record that the pl~aintiff made any response whatsoever to the defendant's demand for a bill of
particulars. On the faee of the com~plaint it appears that this is a case where a bill of particulars may properly be demanded. Hence, had this
default not been t~aken at all, the plaintiff could
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not, as a n1atter of right, have den1anded to be
heard at the trial. Section 6569, R. C.; Martin v.
Heinze, 31 :Jlont. 68, 77 Pac. 427 ; Scott v. Frost,
4 Colo . ..._\pp. 557, 36 Pac. 910.
"',,..,. e find no reversible error in this cause and
recommend that the judgment appealed from be
affirmed.' '
McJ.llanus v. Larson et al, 10 Pac. (2d) 523, 122 Cal.

App. 716.
Justice pro tern Tappaan said at pages 524-5:
''Defendants on 1\fay 13, 1929, the pl~aintiff
still having failed to comply with defendant's demand for a bill of particulars served upon plaintiff a notice that a motion to preclude the plaintiff from giving evidence of the account would
be made on the 20th day of May, 1929. The court
granted defendants' motion upon the day designated in the notice, and, on the same day the defendants' motion to preclude evidence was granted, plaintiff served and filed what purported to
be a bill of particulars of the account. Thereafter
plaintiff made a motion under section 473 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, to be relieved from the
order precluding evidence, iand on June 6, 1929,
this latter motion was denied by the court. The
cause came on for trial on June 18, 1929, and the
court acting under the order made May 20, 1929,
precluding evidence, sustained an objection to the
evidence tendered by plaintiff in support of the
allegation of his complaint. Judgment was thereafter ,entered for defendants. Plaintiff appeals
from the order ~precluding evidence, the order
denying relief under section 473 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, and from the judgment entered
in defendants' favor.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

28

"The first question upon this appeal is
whether the trial court committed error in sustaining defendants' motion to preclude evidence.
The failure on the part of plaintiff to comply
with the demand for a bill of particulars, prior
to the date upon which the motion to preclude
evidence was heard and granted, is admitted, and
in fact it appears. At the hearing had upon this
motion, an affid~vit of plaintiff's assignor was
filed in opposition to the motion, in which affidavit the assignor stated that defendants, some
years before the filing of the affidavit, had been
informed of the items of the account and were
aware of their nature, but that the account covered a long period, and because of its great detail
required considerable time for preparation, which
time assignor did not have because of other duties.
·The record shows that plaintiff had over 50 days
since the service of the demand for the bill of particulars within which to prepare the bill of particulars, and that more than 40 days before the
motion was granted defendants' attorney informed pl!aintiff's attorney that, if the bill was not furnished, he would object to the introduction of
evidenc-e of the account. That the procedure as
adopted by defendants was justified under the
circumstances is beyond question. Motions of this
kind are addressed to the sound discretion of the
trial court. The record fails to disclose that the
trial court in granting this motion exercised other
than a sound discretion. McCarthy v. Mt. Tecarte
L. & W. Co., 110 Cal. 687, 693, 43 P. 391. Plaintiff
had ample time within which to prepare the bill,
was informed by defendants more than a month
prior to the filing of the motion that defendants
would stand upon the terms of the section of the
Code precluding evidence if the bill was not
served and at the time of the granting of the
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n1otion the trial upon· the merits "~as set only 11
days away.''

Proto v. Chenoweth, 263 Pac., page 943.
C. J. R.oss said at pages 944 and 945:
""The next assignment is that the court erred
in permitting the plaintiff to testify as to the
services rendered the deceased, for the reason
that, although a demand had been made for a
copy of plaintiff's account, or a bill of particulars,
none had been delivered to defendant or his attorneys, and under paragraph 421 plaintiff should
not have been permitted to introduce any ·evidence
to support his complaint. The facts in connection
with this contention we have heretofore stated.
Paragraph 421 reads as follows :
"It shall not he necessary for the ~party to set
forth in a pleading the items of an account therein alleged, but he shall deliver to the adverse
party within ten d~ays after a demand therefor, in
writing, a copy of the account, or be precluded
from giving evidence thereof. The court or a
judge thereof may order a further account when
the one delivered is too general or is defective in
any particular. ' '
''The reasons given by the courts of code
states, with a provision like our paragraph 421,
for holding a pleading not setting forth the items
of an account as invulnerable to demurr·er, is that
the adversary may have a copy of the account
upon demand. The very provision of the statute
relieving the pleader from pleading the facts of
the account impos·es upon him the duty to furnish
his opponent the data omitted from the pleading,
and p·recludes his giving any evidence of the acSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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count if he fails to furnish it. Clearly the permissible omission in paragraph 421 disregards
the other statutory provision (paragraph 419,
Civil Code) that 'the pleadings shall consist of
a concise statement of the facts constituting the
plaintiff's cause of action, or the defendant'~
ground of defense,' unless such omission is supplied in the form of a bill of ·particulars. The
common count in the face of the last provision
finds no justification and can only be reconciled
therewith by holding that the pleader who uses
it must comply with the provisions of paragraph
421, and, when demanded, deliver a copy of this
account to the adversary party. * * •
''The reason for requiring an itemized stutement of the account, consisting of items and
transactions running over a considerable period
of time, is obvious. It is to inform the adverse
party with what he is charged and to afford him
an opportunity to marshall his evidence to meet
the charges, otherwise he can justly plead surprise and lack of 'pTe para tion, and especially is
that true in a case like the one at bar. Even if
Proto were alive and himself the defendant, instead of his personal representative, in all fairness he would be entitled to an itemized statement
of what he owed-if not before suit, at least before
trial. How much more is the need of such information on the p~art of the administrator, who must
prepare the defense without any personal knowledge whatever of the items going to make up the
claim against his testator f It is not unreasonable
nor harsh treatmeD:t to require one, claiming to
have rendered professional services on divers
tim·es and occasions for another, to furnish the
l~a.tter, or his personal representative, a statement
of such services in itemized form.
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··It appears that the courts of those states
\Yhose statutes are like our paragraph 421, \vhen
the question of the rights of a ~party failing to
furnish a bill of particulars on dernand has arisen,
haYe held the statute is pere1nptory, ·precluding
such delinquent from offering ~any evidence of
his account. Sanborn Y. Dentler, 97 Wash. 149,
166 P. 62, 6 ...~.L.R. 749; Orange Sav\: Mill Co. v.
Carmichael Lumber Co., 17 N. M. 69, 1:21 P. 608;
Lonsdale Y. Oltman, 50 1\Iinn. 52, 52 N. W. 131.
* * *
"""\\T e haYe thus far considered the point under
discussion as though no bill of particulars was
served upon defendant or filed vvith the court,
upon its order, and in doing so we !are satisfied
we are right. What was served upon defendant
as bills of particulars did not in the least amplify
or explain the general allegations of the complaint. The difference in the first bill of particulars and the complaint was merely verbal; the
seeond one changed the claim from one for services rendered the ·deceased ''and various other
·persons'' to one for services rendered the deceased only; but in neither was there any inkling
given defendant as to the number of visits made
deceased, or the number made ''various other
persons,'' or the character of treatment administered, or medicines furnished. Since the rule is
that a bill of p~articulars limits the proof at the
trial to the items or particular services therein
set forth, the effect, and the only effect, of the
last so-called bill of particulars, was to eliminate
any claim for services rendered 'various other
persons' thus bringing the claim vvithin the demand :filed with the administrator for allowance.
When the complaint and the two so-called bills of
particulars are taken and considered together,
they not only do not inform defendant what he is
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required to meet but leave the issues in extreme
confusion and obscurity.
''The complaint and last bill of particulars inform us that the services rendered deceased were
so rendered, at his instance and request, continuously for 28 months, and that they were reasonably worth $500 per month. We understand from
this allegation that the services were accepted
and rendered under a mutual contract and as
occasion demanded, but without any agreement as
to the price to be paid or received for the various
i terns of services. Under such circumstances the
law says that the party receiving such services
shall ~~ay their reasonable value and no more.
Now, how is that to be determined~ It can only
be determined by finding out what was done for
the deceased and, by witnesses familiar with the
value of that kind of services, prove the value.
How necessary, then, it was that defendant should
have been informed, in advance of the trial, of
the amount and character of services claimed to
have been rendered to his testator, that he might
prep~are his defense! 'To exempt a plaintiff from
this duty would not only disregard the statute
enacted expressly for the guidance of the court,
but leave a defendant, such as the one here, and
his testator's estate without much, if any protection.''

Scott v. Frost, 4 Colo. App. 557, 36 Pac. 910.

J. Reed said at pages 910-11:
''The defendants made a demand in writing
.,_.. ~on th"e'f.Jiillifr
for an itemized statement of
the account sued upon, to which no attention was
paid by the plaintiff. Upon the trial, objection
1

.,..
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'Yas Inade to the introduction of any evidence
"~hich 'Yas oyerruled and an exeeption taken. Section 63 of the l~ivil Code is aR follows : 'It shall
not be necessary for a party to set forth in a
tpleading the items of an account therein alleged;
but he shall \Yithin five days after a demand
thereof in 'vriting by the adverse party, deliver
to him or file a copy of such account or be precluded from giving evidence thereof. The court
or judge may on motion, limit or extend the time
for delivering or filing such an account, 1and may
order a further account "~hen the one delivered
or filed is too general or is defective in any particular.' The items of the different accounts were
not set forth in the pleading, the statements were
general,-only general aggregates or balances
given,-and defendants were entiled to have ~ach
of the different accounts itemized so that they
could contest any individual item of any of the
accounts upon which the suit was brought. The
statute is peremptory. Upon demand, he shall
furnish the itemized account, and, upon failure to
do so, 'shall be precluded from giving evidence
thereof.' The court erred in receiving any evidence without the accounts. Defendants were entitled to be informed, not only of gross ~amounts
claimed to be due, but of each item going to make
up the aggregate. For this error the judgment
must be reversed, and the cause remanded.''

Orange Sawmill Co. v. ·Carmichael Lumber Co., 121
Pac. 608.
C. J. Roberts said at pages '608-609:
''The only proposition involved in this cas·e is
the construction of section 69 of the Code of Civil
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sary for a party to set forth in a ·pleadings the
items of an account therein alleged, but he must
deliver to the adverse party, within ten days
after the demand thereof in writing, a copy of
the account or be precluded from giving evidence
thereof,' etc.
"No itemized statement of the account was
set forth in the complaint, or attached thereto.
From the record in the case, it appears that the
attorney for appellee demanded, in writing, of
appell'ant's attorneys, about four months before
the trial of the case, an itemized statement of the
account, which was never furnished him. Upon
the hearing, counsel for appellant contended that
an itemized statement of the account was attached
as an exhibit to a deposition theretofore taken,
and which was on file in the office of the clerk of
the district court, from vvhich appellee's counsel
could have obtained the information desired.
"That statute is peremptory, and upon p,roper
demand it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to furnish the itemized statement, and the mere fact
that depositions may have been on file in the
clerk's office, which contained an itemized statement of the account, will not obviate the plain
provision of the statute. Upon the trial of the
case, the plaintiff might not have read the depositions and could have proven an entire different
account. The defendant was entitled to be served
with 1a copy of the account, up~n which the plaintiff ex~pected to rely at the trial of the case.
''Several states have practically the same
provision as section 69 qf our Code of Civil ProSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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cedure. The Court of . .\ppeals of Colorado, in the
case of s.cott et al. Y. Frost, 4 Colo. App. 557, 36
Pac. 910, held that a similar statute was peremptory in this reg'ard, and that, upon demand, the
plaintiff \Yas required to furnish the defendant
\Yith a eopy of the account, and that if he failed
to do so the court could not permit any evidence
to be introduced as to such account. The Supreme
Court of ~Iinnesota, in the case of Lonsdale v.
Oltman, 50 }finn. 52, 52 N. W. 131, announces
the same rule. Arppellant could have avoided the
p·en:alty of the statute by a compliance with its
terms "~hich are clear and explicit.''

II.
NOT FINDING ON MATERIAL ISSUES OF ACCOUNTING OF MONIES
ADVANCED BY PLAINTIFF TO THE ACCOUNT OF DEFENDANT.

Appellant in paragraph 9 of her complaint (R. 3)
alleges:

"9. That the defendant has never rendered
an accounting of his labor in the erection of said
Lodge, such that this plaintiff has no knowledge
as to what proportionate interest is claimed by
said defendant in the total expenditures for the
purchase of the land and erection of the Lodge
and operation of said business, and that no accounting of said business has ever been given by
the defendant to the plaintiff although the same
has been demanded and that defendant still fails
and refuses to render such an !accounting or
transfer such proportionate interest as is equitable to the plaintiff i·n and to the real property
hereinbefore mentioned.''
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To paragraph 9 of plaintiff's complaint, respondent
in his Answer, (R. 8) alleges:

"8. Answering paragraph 9, defendant alleges that all of the records in connection with
the erection and operation of said lodge have
been kept by plaintiff under agreement between
plaintiff and defendant and that defendant has
not been granted access to said records by the
plaintiff and is accordingly unable to render an
accounting and further that he has no knowledge
or information concerning the financial status of
the undertaking.''
Thus the question of an accountancy of the monies
advanced by ap.pellant to respondent becomes a material
issue to determine what the status of the partnership
account was at the day of closing of the business.
There has been no Finding made nor any Conclusion
or Decree with reference to whether or not respondent
may have had monies available which he could have paid
out on accounts of the partnership business instead of
:paying out of personal funds. Evidence of payment on
at least one personal account is disclosed by the record
as follows: (R. 108-9)
CROSS EXAMINATION OF DEFEND·ANT
BY MR. BEATIE
'' Q. N oV\r, as a matter of fact, of these particular monies which were being put into your
bank account, the operation of this business,
you've expended over $700 of that sum on a purchase of a car for yourself, haven't you~
A. No, sir.
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Q.

You haYen'tf

. .-\.. Yes, l\Iary gave me the check, th,at 's right,
sir, I am not-

Q. You made out the cheeks, didn't you, all
the timeJ?
~-\..

:\fary ""as a witness to that.

Q.

Did

~~ou

draw the

check~

A. Yes, sir.
And you would. sign the check, wouldn't
you, by which these bills were paid~
Q.

A.

Yes, sir.

Over the period of this time, you have
paid $700 and some-odd dollars on your car,
haven't you~
Q.

A. Yes sir, I believe Mary and I had an
agreement on that.
Q.

I don't care-

THE COURT: Let him tell us about it: I do
care about it.
A. Well, sir, I think we had an agreement on
it; I was getting little bit of the money from the
Government, see, out-I mean, money I got from
the Government, why, we used for just this and
that, and I believe the $700, why, that Mary and
I agreed on the car.

THE COURT: 746, something like
A.

that~

Yes, sir.

THE COURT: I saw that figure here once.
MR. BEATIE: December 24, I believe.
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THE COURT : December 19, '46, there is a
check to Motorway Service for $776.94.

A.

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:
car for yourself'

That was paid by you on a

A. Yes, sir, but the agreement was between
Mary and I on it.''
This Court has repeatedly held:
''It is the well settled law in this jurisdiction
that it is the duty of the trial court to find upon
all of the material issues r1aised by the 'pleadings,
whether evidence resp~ecting them was or was not
adduced, and that it is pTejudicial error for the
trial court to fail to find upon issues raised by
the pleadings and the evidence. ' '
The following case is cited in support of the above
statement:

Duncan v. Hemmelw,right et ux 186 Pac (2d) page
965.
Justice Wolfe said at pages 968-9:
''We pass now to consideration of the second
assignment of error, i.e., the failure of the court
to make findings of fact on cert~ain issues. It is
well settled in this jurisdiction that failure to
make findings of fact on material issues is error,
and is ordinarily prejudicial. Dillon Implement
Co. v. Cleveland, 32 Utah 1, 88 P. 670; Holm v.
Holm, 44 Utah 242, 139 P. 937; Snyder et al. v.
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et al., 51 Utah :291, 169 P. 945; Hall et al.
v. Sabey, 58lTtah 343, 198 P. 1110; Baker v. Hatch,
70 Utah 1, 257 P. 673; Prows v. HavYley et al., 72
Utah 444, 271 P. 31; Simper v. Brown, 74 Utah
178, :278 P. 529 ; Piper v. Eakle, 78 Utah 342, 2 P.
2d 909; ''Test v. Standard Fuel Co., 81 Utah 300,
17 P. :2d 292; Parowan Mercantile Co. v. Gurr et
al., 83 Utah 463, 30 P. 2d 207; Pike v. Clark, 95
Utah 235, 79 P. 2d 1010."

III.
IN FINDING AS IT DID IN PARAGRAPH

6

OF THE FINDINGS OF

FACT AS FOLLOWS: ''THAT DURING AND SINCE THE ERECTION
OF THE LODGE, DEFENDANT HAS MADE MONETARY ADVANCES
TO THE VENTURE

totaling $1,388.49, ''

AND ENTERING ITS

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW BASED ON SAID FINDING THAT DEFENDANT
WAS ENTITLED TO

23%

OF THE PROCEEDS RESULTING FROM

THE SALE OF THE PROPERTY FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS :
(A) THAT DEFENDANT MADE NO ACCOUNTING OF MONIES ADVANCED NOR DID HE SHOW THAT THERE WERE NOT SUFFICIENT
MONIES ADVANCED BY PLAINTIFF TO PAY THE BILLS CLAIMED
BY DEFENDANT.

(B) THAT MONIES CLAIMED TO BE PAID WERE

NOT PROVEN BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE.

(a)

The record discloses, as is set forth In the

following schedule, the ¥arious sums advanced hy appellant and I have thus segregated the schedule to show
those ~payments made by appellant to respondent's bank
account and those paid directly for the benefit of the
business.
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Advanced by Appellant to Respondent's B~ank
Account or Paid For by Respondent.
Bank Acct. Paid Out
3,000.00

R.45 Admitted by pleadings
R. 50 Exhibit C

600.00

R. 51 Exhibit D

4,500.00

R. 52 Exhibit E

2,350.00

R. 52 Exhibit F

900.00)
500.00)

R. 54 Exhibit G
R. 55

810.32

Exhibit I

1,028.94

R. 55 Exhibit J

68.75

R. 56 Exhibit K

20.00

R. 56 Exhibit L

20.00

R. 57 Exhibit M

7.05

R. 59 Exhibit N

49.00

R. 60 Exhibit 0

93.70

R. 62

625.00

Exhibit P
8,850.00

5,722.76

Money placed in bank account

$8,850.00

Money e:x:pended for business

5,722.76

Total

$14,572.76

Exhibit A discloses that there was income from the
operation of the business, as shown in recapitulation of
receipts, the sum of $1492.05, by sales of merchandise,
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and $453.10 from machine-Jute Box, etc., making a
total of $1945.15,

"~hirh

said latter amount was received

in the operation of the business. By adding the sum of
$8,850.00 adYanced by appellant to respondent's bank

accotmt and the total item of cash receipts of the operation of the business, the cash sum is $10,795.15, no
amounts of \Yhich are accounted for by the respondent.

III.
IN FINDING AS IT DID IN PARAGRAPH

6

OF THE :E1INDINGS OF

FACT AS FOLLOWS: "THAT DURING AND SINCE THE ERECTION
OF THE LODGE, DEFENDANT HAS MADE MONETARY ADVANCES
TO THE VENTURE TOTALING

$1,388.49. ''

(b) The Court allowed the defendant and respondent the sum of $1388.49, which is made up of the
various items in the Bill of Particulars:
Utah Power and Light Comp·any

$ 261.38

Mulholland Lumber Comp·anyExhibit 1

462.51
12.60

Park Record-Exhibit 3
Mulholland Hardware Co.

250.00

Young Electric Sign Company

402.00

Total

$1388.49
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With reference to the v~arious amounts, the aforesaid item of $261.38, there is no testimony in the record to
rprove said amount and the only reference to the same is
(R. 88):
''THE COURT: Let me ask him about these
items, Mr. Beatie, ask your client what about this
power and light. You doubt they paid $261.38 in
connection with the operation there~
MISS BALLEN: I don't know anything
about it. I know part of the power and light was
paid out of the business, out of the money taken
in. You can check books if you want; I don't know
"rhether part of that was paid; I don't kno'v ho"r
they could h'ave light bill of that size when not in
operation.''
THE COURT : What about an item for slot
machines ~''
The above is the only reference to the aforesaid
item and is not evidence of the payment of any bill to
the Utah Power and Light Company.
The next item is for the sum of $402.00.
The following testimony is the only evidence with
reference to the same: (R. 90-91-92)
"MR. BEATIE: Object to this ex parte statement; no-

THE COURT: Don't know whether material
or not; right now just inquiring about bills, or
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about Young Electric Sign Company rental on
neon sign: you got documentary sup~port on that 1
. A...

I paid it up to July.

THE COURT:
.A..

July,

'48~

Until April, yes, sir.

THE COlTRT:
.A.pril' ' J?

What do you mean by "until

.A... .A..ll I had to give them $110 when they
put sign in, before they put sign in, from there
until April, I paid them $36.50 a month for the
rental of the sign. From April, I told them I
didn't want the sign any more, and they sent me
this bill for1

THE COURT:
haven't paid it~
A.

Then, since April, '48, you

No, sir.

THE COURT: But $402 is the total you paid
on that sign rental up to April~
A.

Yes, sir.

MR. BEATIE : May I inquire just this with
reference to th-at~ Perhaps sti~pulate; Mr. Gasparae, $402, that included the $110 down-payment~
A.

Sir, I

~plaid

them, the-

MR. BEATIE: Just answer the question:
Does it, or doesn't it~
THE COURT: Just told me before it did
while you were talking to your client.
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THE COURT: It does.
MR. BEATIE: We can not so stipulate, that
was paid by them because I am informed that
$110 will show as expenditure in the journal,
vvhich is Exhibit A.
A. Sir, I gave Mary receipt for that money,
but I paid that money myself. Mary wasn't at
the Lodge 'at the time I got that sign. I gave her
receipt for that sign in November.
THE COURT:
A. Y-es, sir.

The

$110~

THE COURT : You paid the rest of it; that
Is youA. That signTHE COURT:

All right.

Q. Did you make any payments after April
of '48 on that sign~

A. I have made one, I believe, fifty -dollar
payment; I have no receipt for it, and they sent
me the bill for the balance of the sign.''
F·rom the above testimony it is clearly evident that
there is no testimony at all with reference to the sum of
$261.38, nor is there any proof, other than the statement
of respondent that he paid the sum of $292.00 on account
of Young Electric Sign Company.
The Court erred then in giving credit on the item
of $261.38 and $402.00, assuming that evidence of the
credits are proper.
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IN FINDING :\S IT DID IX PARAGRAPH

8

OF THE FINDINGS OF

FACT AS FOLLO,YS :

''THAT THE SERVICES PERFORMED BY THE DE:FENDANT FROM
SEPTE)IBER,

1946,

TO FEBRUARY,

LODGE HAVE A REASONABLE YALUE

1947, IN ERECTING THE
OF $2,160.00, SAID AMOUNT

BEIXG BASED ON AX AVERAGE OF TEN HOURS WORK PER DAY
FOR SIX DAYS PER "\"\~EK FOR

24

WEEKS AT THE RATE OF

$1.50

PER HOUR; THAT THE SERVICES PERFORMED BY THE DEFENDA.:XT IN MANAGING, OPERATING AND MAINTAINING THE LODGE

1947, UNTIL JUNE, 1947,
$1,440.00, SAID AMOUNT BEING

DrRIXG THE PERIOD FROM FEBRUARY,
HAYE A REASONABLE VALUE OF

BASED OX AN AVERAGE OF TEN HOURS PER DAY FOR SIX DAYS
PER WEEK FOR

16

WEEKS AT THE RATE OF

$1.50

PER HOUR :

THAT THE SERVICES PERFORMED BY THE DEFENDANT IN MANAGING, OPERATING AND MAINTAINING THE LODGE FOR THE
PERIOD FROM JUNE TO NOVEMBER,
VALUE OF

$714.00,

HAVE A REASONABLE

SAID AMOUNT BEING BASED ON AN AVERAGE

OF SEVEN HOURS PER DAY FOR
AT THE RATE OF

1947,

6 DAYS PER WEEK

$1.00 PER HOUR,''

FOR

17

WEEKS

AND ENTERING ITS CONCLU·-

SION OF LAW BASED ON SAID FINDING THAT DEFENDANT AFTER
PAYMENT OF DEBTS FROM THE PROCEEDS OF THE SALE OF THE
PROPERTY WAS ENTITLED TO
ING REASON:

(a)

23%

THEREOF, FOR THE FOLLOW-

THAT THE ONLY EVIDENCE OF THE VALUE O:F

THE SERVICE OF DEFENDANT IS THE RATE OF

$1.00

PER HOUR

AND THE TOTAL NU.MBER OF HOURS WORKED IS SPECULATIVE.

The following is the record which discloses the testimony of the respondent as to the amount of work exSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Jl·ended and the rate of pay on the building of the Little
Pine Lodge. (R. 80)
"MR. NESLEN: That is what I want to ask
him.
Q. Mr. Gas parae, in building this Lodge, just
e:x!plain to the court what you did.

A. Well, I did just about everything-! mean,
I took care of-" (R. 81)

'' Q. Well, what specifically did you do l\fr.
Gasparac, in building the Lodge~
MR. BEATIE: Let's tie the time, will you,
so we can at least have right of cross e)Camination.

Q. When did you start to build this Lodge,
Mr. Gasparac ~

A. I don't remember exact date; it was in
Se:ptember.
Had you done any work in connection
with this venture prior to September, '46 ~
Q.

A. I was the one that looked over the property and made arrangements for the property. I
made 'arrangements for the survey, and I did most
of the work checking the property and everything.
Now, did you hire any help in connection
with the building of this Lodge~
Q.

A. Yes, Mary's brother and the two friends
and the carpenter." (R. 82).
Did you yourself do any work in connection. with the building of this Lodge~
'' Q.

A.

Yes, I did.
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Q.

~lanual

work, \vhat \vas the nature of that

work!
. A..

I worked on it from the time we started;
I 'vorked ""'"ith her brother from the first time we
started it right on up until it was finished, I
did everything." (R. 83)
X o"~, \Yhat hours did you \vork in the
construction of this Lodge~
'' Q.

A. Oh, I couldn't-couldn't put it down as
any amount of hours~ I mean, I worked all day
and some of the nights.
Did you have any other employment during that time~
Q.

A.

Mary's brother helped me.

Q.

I mean, did you have any other job during

that

time~

A. Oh, no; none at all. I devoted my full
time to the Lodge from the time I started it until
it was finished.
Q.

That was a period of about how many

months~

A. That was from September till July; I
never worked excep.t at the Lodge from September till July.'' (R. 84)
'' Q. After the Lodge was completed in F'ehruary, what work did you do in connection with this
venture~

A. Well, I run the Lodge, and Mary also ; I
mean we worked; we opened it up and we run it
at night; in the daytime, I would work around
the Lodge with things that had to he done. The
Lodge wasn't fully complete; it isn't fully comSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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pleted to this day. The upstairs isn't completed,
and I worked on it all the time.
Did you do any other work on the building of the Lodge after February~
Q.

1

A. Yes, I worked all, in the summer doing the
landscaping, and we have a pumphouse that we
had to build, reservoir and everything ; all that
had to be fixed.'' (R. 100-101)
''MR. BEATIE : No further cross examination, your Honor.
MR. NESLEN:

No further questions.

THE COURT : I would like to ask him one
or two questions.
MR. BEATIE: I hope it isn't what I didn't
desire to cross on.
THE COURT : I don't care what your hopes
tare, Mr. Beatie, I have to find out about these
things ; that is, certain things, I see, that are not
covered in the testimony to my satisfaction. I
still don't know what kind of work you did in
building that Lodge, except that you were the
general supervisor of the work; are you a carpenter, or do you do carpenter work~
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

You did do some carp·enter

work~

A. Well, sir, if you would let me, I could
· probably tell you in my own words just whatthere was no question-! mean, when we built the
Lodge, between Mary and I, there was no question
·as to whether I was a carpenter or not. I was to
handle the building of the Lodge, and I did everything. I did everything from digging ditches to
pouring cement, carpenter work.
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THE COURT: I a1n not talking about
whether you are a technieal journeyman with a
card, but you haven't told me 'vhat you did as
yet. Right now, you told me more than you did
before. You did every kind of '"·ork 'vith your
handsJ?
1

_..-\..

Yes, sir.

THE COURT : You didn't stand around
"~atehing other people work, and hiring them; you
actually got in and worked~
...-\..

Yes, sir.

(The following examination is by THE CO·URT)
What do you base this figure of $600 a
month on 1 How do you arrive at a figure of $600
a month? You just pick that out of the air, or
actually base on some hourly rate on what you
did, or how did you arrive at it~
Q.

A. I can't answer that, I mean, the way you
put the question.
Answer it way you would like to answer
it, but tell me where you arrive at that figure
somehow or other.
Q.

A. My full time-I might be able to tell you
this way: My full time from the time I started
that Lodge has been spent with it. I spent all my
time with it; that is all I did. If it wasn't building it, it was something concerning it. I wasn't,
or I was doing something all the time. (R. 103104)

Q. Let me ask y-ou this : How much did you
pay these boys that did the labor you referred to,
two boys besides her brother~
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Q.

You can't tell

me~

A. I don't remember, s1r, I never handled
any of the books.
hour~

Q.

Pay by the day or by the

A.

Yes, sir, 'Paid by the hour.

Q.

Do you know what the hourly r;ate

A.

A dollar an hour, sir.

was~

Well, was your time worth-more valuable than theirs~
Q.

A. Well, no, I wouldn't say that.
Q.

on this
A.

How many hours did you actually put in
place~

Sir~

How many hours did you actually put in
on this place, working on it?
Q.

A.
on it.

Some days, I would put in fifteen hours

Q. Well, could you give us some idea of how
many hours you put in, ialtogether?
A.

No, I couldn't, sir.

Q. From September until February-September, 1946 till February, 1947 when it opened,
that is when it was substantially constructed;
wasn't it~
A.

Yes, sir.

Then, thereafter, you both operated the
lodge, and also did more construction work~
Q.

A.

Yes, sir.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

51
Q. FL"{ed up and painted and other incidentals necessary to keep the Lodge in a proper.L-\..

Yes, sir.

Q. -shape. You ever compute the hours you
put in on this Lodge~
. ...-\.. ~ o, sir, I never; I never even thought
about it. I never kept a receipt or anything. I
nev-er had -any reason to do that.

Q. You have a reason, now, don't you, you
are claiming some compensation for your efforts
there~

. .-\.. Well-

Q. I understand you didn't ever keHp a current account of the time you put in, but, since
that time, and since this lawsuit haven't you computed about how much time you put in on this
Lodge~

A. No, sir, I am paying bills right now forand still paying bills on it, and I still don't keep
the receipts for it.

Q. Now, I understand your testimony is the
same as hers about the matter of your agreement
to construct the Lodge together~
A.

Yes, sir." (R. 106)

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
By MR. NESLEN:
'' Q. I believe you testified, in answer to the
Judge, that you were-rate of pay in building the
Lodge was not worth any more than these laborers; did you say that~
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A. Well, yes, I mean, not the way he put it,
I mean I didn't-when I was building the Lodge,
I wasn't hired out; I wasn't hired out for any
rate of pay."
From the above evidence it is clear that there never
was any testimony on the part of the respondent or any
other person that his services were worth more than
$1.00 per hour, thus the Court would be in error in computing the first two items of work on the part of the
respondent between September 1946 and June 1947 at
the rate of $1.50 per hour when the third item of labor
is only at the value of $1.00 per hour. It is further contended that there is no proof of the working of any ascertained number of hours on the part of the respondent
between September 1946 and November 1947.
CONCLUSION
The Judgment in favor of plaintiff and defendant
should be reversed. That the Court erred in admitting
evidence on the part of the res'pondent to prove the value
of labor and monies expended when no Bill of Particulars 'vas filed. Further, in not finding as to the material
issues and accounting of monies advanced by the plaintiff, plus the monies in the sum of $1,945.15 income from
the operation of the business, in a total sum of $10,795.14, of which not one penny is accounted for. ·Further,
that there was no showing or any finding of there not
having been sufficient monies advanced by ~ap~pellant or
income from sales to pay all bills claimed by respondent,
and that there was not any proof of S"aid bills, claimed
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paid by respondent 'Yhirh the ('1ourt gave eredit for, nor
"1'ere the monies rlaimed paid by defPndant on account
of business debts proven by competent evidence. Further, that the testimony upon "1'hich the defendant was
granted an agg:regate sum of $4,314.00 for services performed, is in error, that defendant never proved his services "Torth more than $1.00 per hour and no certain
number of hours \Yere ever proven to be the basis of his
work credit.
It is therefore respectfully submitted, that the case
should be reversed and remanded to the trial Court for
accounting in the matter and further proceedings.
Respectfully submitted,

W. D. BEATIE,
Attorney for Plamtiff
and Appellant.
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